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A number of amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act' were en-
acted by the 1979 Legislature, although none appear to involve major
changes in the Act. It is important to take note of the effective date of each
amended section, since those dates vary from May to August 1979.
Article 8306, Section 2a. This section provides that the employment of
Texas residents by any nonresident employer constitutes constructive ap-
pointment of the chairman of the Industrial Accident Board (hereinafter,
the Board) as its agent for service of process. The previous statute was
applicable to injury or death occurring in the State of Texas. The amend-
ment extends the applicability of the statute to injuries or deaths occurring
outside the state when the employee is a Texas resident who was recruited
in the state for employment.
Article 8306, Section 7. That portion of section 7 requiring reports of med-
ical or chiropractic care has been rewritten. Hospitals are now expressly
included in the statute and are obligated to furnish records pertaining to
treatment of the employee. In addition, the section has been amended (a)
to allow the carrier to question the fairness and reasonableness of charges
for medical services, and (b) to require the Board, in its award, to make
express findings with reference thereto. Provisions are made for the appeal
of the Board's decision regarding charges, and the successful party on ap-
peal is entitled to recover a twelve percent penalty and attorney's fees
under certain circumstances.
Article 8306, Section 8a. This section enumerates the beneficiaries and
provides for the distribution of death benefits when injury results in the
death of the employee. The section has been amended to exclude any par-
ent who has abandoned a worker during "a substantial period of the mi-
nority" of the deceased worker. The section provides that the benefits that
might otherwise have gone to that parent shall be paid as if the parent had
predeceased the deceased worker. The amendment appears to apply irre-
spective of the worker's age at time of death. While the first sentence of
the amendment refers only to abandonment of the worker, the second sen-
* B.A., Texas Tech University; LL.B., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Naman,
Howell, Smith, Lee & Muldrow, Waco, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309i (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980) [hereinaf-
ter referred to as the Act].
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tence, regarding burden of proof, seems to expand the excluding event by
stating: "The burden of proof shall be upon any beneficiary seeking to
disqualify the parent on the grounds of abandonment or failure to sup-
port."
2
Article 8306, Section 12c-2. This section modifies the method of funding
the Second Injury Fund. Subsection (b), as amended, provides that the
total amount of payments into the fund must now equal or exceed
$750,000 in excess of liabilities, rather than the previous figure of $250,000,
before further payments to the fund are suspended. In addition, the trig-
gering figure on the "downhill side," requiring resumption of contributions
to the fund, has been increased from $125,000 to $300,000. Unfortunately,
the amendments to this section do not resolve all the ambiguities inherent
in the previous terminology. 3 Some uncertainty has been removed by de-
leting from the statute the phrase "in excess of existing liabilities," and
replacing it with the more precise phrase, "in excess of liabilities, whether
vested or contingent."'4
Doubt has previously existed as to when and how the final determina-
tion could be made that a deceased employee was not, in fact, survived by
a person entitled to compensation because of the employee's death. In an
effort to resolve this question, or at least to attempt to provide a workable
solution, subsection (c) has been amended to provide for a presumption
that there are no surviving beneficiaries when no claim for death benefits is
filed with the Board within eight months following the date of death. The
amendment contains a proviso that states: "provided, however, that the
presumption created hereby shall not apply against minor beneficiaries or
to beneficiaries of unsound mind for whom no guardian has been ap-
pointed."5 The meaning of this proviso is not entirely clear.
An amendment to subsection (d) further provides that if the Board ren-
ders an award ordering contribution to the fund and it is subsequently
determined that a lawful beneficiary existed and is entitled to recover
death benefits, the carrier making the prior contribution is entitled to reim-
bursement.
Article 8307, Section 7. The amendment to section 7 alters the require-
ments for filing the Employer's First Report of Injury. The former statute
stated in part: "Within eight (8) days after the occurrence of an accident
resulting in an injury . . . causing. . . absence from work for more than
one (1) day ...a written report thereof shall be made to the Board
.... "6 The amended section now states, in part: "After the occurrence
of an accident resulting in an injury to an employee, causing his absence
from work for more than one (1) day, . . . a written report thereof shall be
2. Id. art. 8306, § 8a (Vernon Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
3. See text accompanying notes 60-69 infra.
4. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c-2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
5. Id § 12c-2(c).
6. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, § 12, at 181.
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made within eight (8) days following said absence from work . .. .,7
Article 8307a. This section establishes proper venue for the filing of suits
to appeal Board awards. Although article 8307, section 5,8 was amended
in 1977 to allow the filing of appeals either in the county of injury or in the
county where the employee resided at the time of injury, article 8307a was
not amended, and retained language that allowed filing of suit only in the
county where the injury occurred. The former article 8307a further stated
that if suit were brought in a county other than the county of injury, the
court in which the action was filed, upon ascertaining that fact, should
transfer the case to the county where the injury occurred. The current
amendment to article 8307a conforms the two provisions by providing that
the party appealing the Board award shall bring suit in the county of in-
jury, or in the county where the employee resided at the time of injury, or
in cases of death, in the county where the employee resided at the time of
death. Following the format of the prior statute, the amendment also pro-
vides that if suit is brought in any county other than those provided above,
the court in which the suit is filed shall, upon ascertaining that fact, trans-
fer the case to a proper court in the county where the injury occurred or
where the employee resided at the time of injury or death. The amended
statute does not specify which county the court should select in transfer-
ring the case when the counties of injury and residence are different. Not
even the "race to the courthouse" that now occurs under article 8307, sec-
tion 5, can resolve the transfer question.
Article 8308, Sections 18a and 20a. The 1979 amendments altered the re-
porting of the subscriber status of an employer and the cancellation or
nonrenewal of a policy by a carrier. The amended section 20a now states
that if a carrier fails to notify a subscriber of cancellation or nonrenewal of
a policy, the policy is automatically extended until the required notice is
given.
Article 8309, Section 2. The amendment merely makes article 8308, sec-
tion 20a, discussed above, applicable to any carrier writing workers' com-
pensation coverage.
Article 8309g, Sections 1, 6, and 12. This article governs workers' compen-
sation insurance for state employees. The definition of employee, con-
tained in section 1(1), is expanded to include a person who is paid from
state funds but whose duties require that they work and frequently receive
supervision in a political subdivision of the state. The list of persons ex-
7. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1980). This amendment is
apparently in response to the construction placed on the old statute by Lowe v. Pacific Em-
ployers Indem. Co., 559 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (time for
filing report runs from date of injury rather than from receipt of notice, thus employer is not
required to file report unless employee has been absent from work more than one day out of
first eight days after accident).
8. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
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cluded from the definition of employee, enumerated in section 1(2), is al-
tered, in part, to provide:
Persons who are at the time of injury performing. services for the
federal government and who are covered by some form of federal
workers' compensation, including those working under Comprehen-
sive Employment and Training Act of 1973 programs; prisoners or
inmates of a prison or correctional institution; clients or patients of
any state institution or agency.9
The amendments to sections 6 and 12 relate to accident prevention re-
porting and to the use of sick leave and emergency leave.
Article 8309h. This article governs coverage for employees of political sub-
divisions. As an addition to the existing article, section 9 states, in effect,
that an employee hired under the Federal Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act of 1973 shall be considered an employee of the prime
sponsor, or its contractor or subcontractor, and that the "borrowed servant
doctrine" shall not apply.' 0
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Course of Employment
Going to and from Work. Injuries received while going to or returning
from work are not received in the course of employment unless they have
to do with and originate in the work, business, trade, or profession of the
employer, are received by the employee while engaged in or about the
furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer, and fall within one
of the provisions of article 8309, section lb."1 This general rule was ap-
plied to deny recovery in Rodriguez v. Texas Employers' Insurance Associa-
tion. 12 In Rodriguez a store clerk was directed by his superior to report to
work at 8:00 a.m. on a Sunday morning. This was overtime work and not
within the employee's usual hours of employment. The employee was
killed on his way home, after work, traveling by his customary route. The
9. Id. art. 8309g, § 1(2)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1980). Section 1(2)(C) formerly read: "Per-
sons who are at the time of injury performing services for a political subdivision of the state
or federal government, or who are controlled by an agency other than the State of Texas."
1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 433, § I, at 1144.
10. Under the borrowed servant doctrine, an employee of the lending employer may
become the employee of the borrowing employer when the employee is directed or permit-
ted by the lender to perform the services of the borrower. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 227 (1958). An important test in determining whether the employee is truly bor-
rowed is the right of control. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Warden, 471 S.W.2d 425, 428
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If the employee of the lender is placed
under the control of the borrower as to the manner of performing the borrower's services,
the employee becomes a borrowed employee. If the employee, on the other hand, remains
under the control of the lender or if a contract states that the right of control remains in the
lender, then the employee is not borrowed. Sanchez v. Leggett, 489 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, writ refd n.r.e.). The effect of the statute is to prevent
governmental entities from incurring liability when they borrow the services of CETA train-
ees from a CETA prime sponsor.
11. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1963).
12. 583 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
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plaintiff contended that because of this overtime work, the employee was
engaged in a "special mission" for his employer, and the going to and
coming from work was included therein. The court correctly treated the
case as a simple "to and from" work injury. The mere fact that this was
extra work, on a day and for hours that were not the employee's customary
hours of work, did not change the result under the general rule or consti-
tute a "special mission."' 3
More interesting questions of travel were presented in Gardner v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 14 In Gardner a country club employee reg-
ularly worked a split shift from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., was off duty until
5:30 p.m., then resumed work until closing time. He drove his own vehicle
to and from the club. Because the split shift necessitated an extra trip each
day between the employee's residence and the club, the employer paid the
employee an additional $50.00 per month. On the day before the accident,
the employee had completed the second shift of work around 10:00 p.m.
He left the club and drove toward his home by way of his usual route.
Before reaching home, however, he stopped at a bar located on the high-
way between the country club and his residence, where he remained until
5:30 or 6:00 a.m. the following morning. He then resumed travel on the
highway, going toward his home, and was killed in an auto collision. No
contention was made that the employee was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. The trial court rendered a summary judgment that the benefi-
ciaries take nothing. On appeal, the Amarillo court of civil appeals re-
versed and remanded the case for trial, identifying questions of fact about
whether the accident occurred in the course of employment. 15
Two interesting questions are raised by the case. First, the court con-
cluded that section lb of article 830916 raised a fact issue: "Unless trans-
portation . . . is paid for by the employer, . . . such transportation shall
not be the basis for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of
such transportation is sustained in the course of employment."'1 7 The
plaintiff might have argued that the employer's payment of $50.00 per
month for the "split shift" travel was transportation paid for by the em-
ployer. The facts, however, suggest that only the added travel required by
the split shift was contemplated by the employer and employee in this ad-
ditional payment. It seems unlikely that the employer and employee in-
tended the "travel pay" to cover the first trip from home to work each
morning and the last trip from work to home in the evening.
Without expressly discussing the effect of a deviation from the work-
connected journey, the court seems to follow without comment what Pro-
fessor Larson refers to as the "general rule." That rule, according to Pro-
fessor Larson,' 8 is that when the employee is engaged in travel within the
13. Id at 637.
14. 574 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
15. Id at 639.
16. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967).
17. Id.
18. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 19 (1979).
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course of his employment, and deviates from that travel onto a purely per-
sonal mission, the employee is restored to course of employment status
when he resumes travel toward his original destination by way of the origi-
nal route. The applicability of the general rule would seem doubtful in
this case, because of the clear deviation of the employee, the substantial
period of time involved in the deviation, and the probable fact that the
employee would not always go directly to his home following work. 19
Termination. A questionable result was reached in Ellison v. Trailfe, Inc. 20
Ellison brought a common law action against her employer and a co-
worker for bodily injuries arising out of an assault. Some difficulty on the
job had resulted either in Ellison's resigning from employment or being
fired. She remained on the premises, however, to receive her final pay
check. A fight occurred between Ellison and a co-worker while Ellison
was waiting for her check. The defendants contended that at the time of
the fight, the employer was a subscriber and Ellison was still in the course
of employment, performing her last act as an employee. Thus, both the
employer and Ellison's co-worker would have been protected from com-
mon law liability by the Act. The trial court rendered summary judgment
for the defendants. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case,
holding that once the employment status had been terminated, injuries re-
ceived thereafter were not in the course of employment. Therefore, the
Act could not be used defensively to bar a common law action.2' The
critical point, then, was that once the employment contract is terminated,
the course of employment, for purposes of recovery under the Act, termi-
nates at that moment also. Thus, even the act of taking one's final
paycheck is outside the course of employment.
It is unclear whether the same conclusion would have been reached had
the employee been asserting a claim for recovery under the Act rather than
the employer asserting the Act as a defense to the common law action.
Professor Larson states:
Compensation coverage is not automatically and instantaneously
terminated by the firing or quitting of the employee. He is deemed to
be within the course of employment for a reasonable period while he
winds up his affairs and leaves the premises ...
Moreover, the allowed interval should be long enough to encom-
pass the incidents that flow directly from the employment, although
they may take effect after employment has technically ceased. Not
19. In support of the "general rule," see, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Levine, 67 F.2d 816,
818 (5th Cir. 1933). But for possible contrary holdings, see Rigsby v. Pitner, 334 S.W.2d 837,
843-44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, no writ), and Southern Cas. Co. v. Ehlers, 14
S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1929, no writ).
20. 580 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
21. Id. at 615. The court carefully limited its holding to instances in which the termina-
tion occurs (a) "in a place of safety" and (b) where the "parties are not subject to the inher-
ent hazards arising from the employment itself." Thus, a substantial hole is left open for the
defensive use of the Act in cases of post-termination injuries. Id
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infrequently when a man is fired, there is a backwash of anger which
may lead to injury, as when a foreman assaults an employee he has
just fired. Compensation is clearly called for when an incident of this
kind occurs shortly after the firing. 22
By its express language, however, the Texas court appears to have adopted
a rule that strictly honors the time of termination, with the situs of the
injury being the sole means for expanding the course of employment 23 and
not the "reasonable time thereafter" rule enunciated by Professor Larson.
Fights. The traditional view has been that the Act was intended to encom-
pass accidental injuries rather than intentional ones. 24 Thus, intentional
injuries inflicted by the employer give rise to an election on the part of the
employee either to seek compensation under the Act or to seek common
law damages. If the employee claims and accepts benefits under the Act,
he is precluded from then seeking common law damages from the em-
ployer.25 Likewise, if the employee accepts compensation benefits for an
intentional injury inflicted by a fellow-employee, this "election" precludes
his subsequent common law action for damages against the fellow-em-
ployee.26
When compensation is neither claimed nor accepted, no election is
made. In Porter v. Downing27 an assault was committed on the employee
by a fellow-employee on the employer's premises, during working hours,
and under circumstances where the assault was directed against the injured
employee as an employee, and not for purely personal reasons. Although
the employer was a subscriber, the injured employee made no claim for
compensation and instead brought a common law action against the fel-
low-employee, alleging an intentional injury. The court correctly held that
the intentional injury fell outside the Act, in that a claim under the Act was
not the sole remedy available. The employee was free to choose his reme-
dies, though once he has claimed and collected under one, he is estopped
to claim another.28 The court stated that a cause of action based upon an
"intentional," as opposed to an "accidental," injury is a constitutionally
protected right, and thus the legislature cannot deprive the injured party of
22. A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 26.10.
23. The court suggested indirectly that if the employee is injured soon after termination
in a hazardous location such as the plant instead of a personnel office, as here, he may be
deemed to be still in the course of employment. 580 S.W.2d at 615.
24. Castleberry v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 283 S.W. 141 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926,
judgmt adopted).
25. Jones v. Jeffreys, 244 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ refd).
26. Moore v. Means, 549 S.W.2d 417, 418-19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Heibel v. Bermann, 407 S.W.2d 945, 946-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, no
writ). The dissenting opinion in Moore makes a valid point, stressing that when the conduct
of the offending fellow-employee is of such a character that it would not create vicarious
liability of the employer under tort concepts, being outside the course of employment from
the viewpoint of the offending fellow-employee, a common law action by the injured em-
ployee against the fellow-employee should not be precluded by acceptance of compensation
benefits. 549 S.W.2d at 419-20. See also Ward v. Wright, 490 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
27. 578 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. Id at 461.
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his or her right to a common law action. In the workers' compensation
field, the state has created a statutory mechanism for recovery against the
employer. When intentional injury has been inflicted, however, the Act
provides an alternative means of redress but not the sole means.29
Injuryfrom Inoculation. In the leading case of Texas Employers' Insurance
Association v. Mitchell30 an employee was directed by his employer to re-
ceive a smallpox vaccination. When an infection followed the receipt of
the vaccination, the injury was held to be compensable and received in the
course of employment.
In the recent case of City ofAustin v. Smith 31 the court upheld compen-
sation for a fireman who voluntarily elected to accept a swine flue inocula-
tion offered by his employer and later developed an adverse reaction to the
inoculation. Although the employee was not required to accept the shot,
he was encouraged to do so by the employer. The inoculation was pro-
vided by "the government," and was administered by the employer
through its agents and employees. The plaintiff drove to the site for the
inoculation in the employer's vehicle under circumstances arranged by the
employer, and was in constant radio contact with headquarters, in order to
respond to any emergency calls. A representative of the employer testified
that it had been made "pretty clear" to the employees that the employer
wanted them to have the inoculation. 32 This evidence was held sufficient
to sustain a jury finding of course of employment.
Initially, the court stated the general proposition that injury through in-
oculation is covered by the Act "'if there is a combination of strong urging
by the employer and some element of mutual benefit. . . . ",33 The court
noted three additional principles that supported the finding. First, course
of employment exists when the risk of injury "exists as one of the condi-
tions of employment. '34 Secondly, "acts essential to the health, comfort
and convenience of an employee while at work are incidental to his serv-
ice."' 35 Therefore, injuries arising from these acts are compensable under
the Act. Finally the court stated that the employee can combine purely
personal purposes with the discharge of his duties and still be considered
in the course of employment. 36 The court concluded, then, that the evi-
dence supported the jury's finding of course of employment.
B. Employee
Coveragefor Partner-Owner. Many older cases have held that an owner-
employer does not qualify as an "employee" within the terms and provi-
29. Id.
30. 27 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1930, writ dism'd).
31. 579 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1979, no writ).
32. Id. at 87.
33. Id (quoting A. LARSON, supra note 18, § 27.32).
34. Id (quoting Garcia v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 413, 419, 209 S.W.2d 333,
339 (1948)).
35. 579 S.W.2d at 87-88.
36. Id at 88.
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sions of the Act. 37 Amendments to article 8309, section la now permit a
partner, sole proprietor, or any corporate executive officer to be covered by
the employer's policy, at the election of the employer. In Powell v. Vigilant
Insurance Co. 38 recovery of compensation was denied to a partner-owner
of a business; the policy did not provide for coverage of the partners. The
plaintiff attempted to sustain coverage by showing that the insurer in-
tended to write a special insurance contract that included the plaintiff. The
plaintiff's only proof was his affidavit that after issuance of the policy, the
independent agent through whom the policy was acquired had assured
him that he was covered. The affidavit further stated that plaintiffs salary
was included in the financial statements used to compute the premiums.
This proffer was not enough to create an issue of fact regarding the crea-
tion of a special contract of insurance; hence one of the essential elements
of plaintiff's cause of action was defeated as a matter of law.39
C. Actions
Occupational Disease-Repetitious "Mental Stimuli. " Article 8306, section
20, was amended significantly in 1971, to change and broaden the scope
and coverage for occupational diseases. Occupational disease was defined
in the amendment as:
any disease arising out of and in the course of employment which
causes damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and such
other diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom. An "Occu-
pational Disease" shall also include damage or harm to the physical
structure of the body occurring as the result of repetitiousphysical trau-
matic activities extending over a period of time and arising in the
course of employment. .... 40
In a very significant case, Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn,41 the
supreme court considered the compensability of an incapacity caused by
repetitious mental stimuli extending over a period of time. Maksyn was
employed in stressful and demanding newspaper publishing work for
many years. In his work he was subjected to a battery of mental stimuli,
which included working fifty-five to sixty-five hours a week for many
years, working at home at night, receiving frequent phone calls at home at
night, and frequently missing lunch and dinner. His work was hectic, and
required him to deal continuously with problems. He worked eighty-seven
hours during his last week of employment. The mental strain, overwork,
exhaustion, and managerial duties culminated in hypertension, nervous-
ness, vertigo, weakness, dizziness, depression, and disability to work.42
The jury found that Maksyn sustained an occupational disease produced
by repetitious physical traumatic activity, and that he was totally and per-
37. See, e.g., Superior Ins. Co. v. Kling, 160 Tex. 155, 158, 327 S.W.2d 422, 424 (1959);
Southern Sur. Co. v. Inabnit, 119 Tex. 67, 71, 24 S.W.2d 375, 377 (1930).
38. 577 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
39. Id. at 366-67.
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
41. 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979).
42. Id. at 335.
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manently disabled thereby.43
The supreme court reversed and rendered judgment that the employee
take nothing. In doing so, the court sustained the carrier's contention that
there was no evidence of an occupational disease caused by repetitious
physical traumatic activity, but only evidence of mental stimuli.44 The
court held that article 8306, section 20 does not afford coverage for an
occupational disease caused by repetitious mental traumatic activity ex-
tending over a period of time.45
Although the court was concerned only with a contention of no evidence
of repetitious physical activity, the court went further to make two impor-
tant observations regarding article 8306, section 20. First, the court re-
affirmed the requirement that an "injury," as contrasted with an "occupa-
tional disease," must be accidental, and the result of an undesigned, unto-
ward event, traceable to a definite time, place, and cause.46 The accidental
injury may result from either physical trauma or mental stimuli, 47 but in
either case there must be an ascertainable single event. Secondly, the court
expressly re-affirmed the legislature's recognition and retention of the dis-
tinction between accidental injuries and occupational diseases in the 1971
amendment to article 8306, section 20.48 Thus, while accidental mental
stimuli are compensable under the Act, occupational diseases must be
those that cause damage to the "physical structure of the body" and must
be the result of "repetitious physical traumatic activity." 49
Occupational Disease-Repetitious Physical Traumatic Activity. In Lubbock
Independent School District v. Bradley50 plaintiff Bradley sought recovery
for an "injury" that occurred in September 1976 "from constant and re-
peated bending, lifting, and carrying of heavy objects."' 5' Approximately
fourteen months earlier, Mrs. Bradley had slipped and fallen, thereby in-
juring her back, while in the course of her employment. After a short con-
valescence, she returned to her same duties. By early September 1976, she
began to suffer back pains, which steadily worsened until she finally quit
her job in late September. After trial the jury verdict for total and perma-
nent incapacity was affirmed by the Amarillo court.
Because the opinion is unclear about whether the case was submitted to
the jury as a case involving accidental injury or one involving occupational
disease caused by repetitious physical traumatic activity, it is uncertain
whether the appellate court recognized and considered the distinctions be-
tween the two theories of recovery. At one point the court observed that:
"Plaintiff pleaded and adduced evidence that her injury was caused by
43. Id. at 335 n. L
44. Id. at 339.
45. Id at 336-39.
46. Id at 338.
47. Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
48. 580 S.W.2d at 337-39.
49. Id at 337.
50. 579 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Id at 79.
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repetitious physical traumatic activities which took place in the course of
her employment, that is, by constant and repeated bending, lifting, and
carrying of heavy items."'52 On the other hand, the trial court submitted a
definition of "injury" 53 that was an improper mixture of the concepts of
"occupational disease" caused by repetitious physical activities and aggra-
vation of a previously existing condition.54 As only a portion of the charge
is set out in the opinion, one cannot tell with accuracy whether the case
was actually submitted to the jury and affirmed as one involving injury or
occupational disease or aggravation of a previously existing condition.
The court observed that the defendant requested a definition which, for all
practical purposes, quoted the language of article 8306, section 20,55 but
the court failed to mention whether the defendant objected to the defini-
tion actually given.
Third Party Actions. Section 6a of article 8307 controls actions against
third parties whose negligence brings about injury of a covered employee
and results in payment of compensation benefits by a carrier. In City of
Houston .Twin City Fire Insurance Co. 56 an employee of a private corpo-
ration received a compensable injury as a result of a collision with a city of
Houston vehicle. The employee asserted a compensation claim that was
eventually settled by agreed judgment. The employee had not given the
required notice of the injury and claim to the city within ninety days of the
accident, as required by the city's charter.57 The carrier, however, had no-
tified the city of its subrogation claim within thirty days after entry of the
agreed judgment in the compensation suit, which occurred several months
after the accident itself. The trial court concluded that the cause of action
accrued to the carrier when the compensation claim was settled and that its
notice to the city, therefore, was timely filed.58
52. Id at 82.
53. "Injury" includes damage or harm to the physical structure of the body oc-
curring as the result of repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over
a period of time and such diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom,
or the incitement, acceleration, or aggravation of any disease, infirmity, or condi-
tion, previously or subsequently existing, by reason of such damage or harm.
1d at 81 (emphasis added).
54. The combined instruction would not have affected the outcome, because the case
was governed by the 1971 version of art. 8306, § 12c, which "made the insurer liable for all
compensation provided by the Act," regardless of whether part of the incapacity resulted
from prior compensation injuries. 579 S.W.2d at 79. See 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 316, § 1,
at 1257. Such a combined instruction would arguably be improper under the 1977 version
of the statute, which limits the worker's recovery from the insurer to the amount of compen-
sation he would have been entitled to had there been no previous injury. See TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1980); cf. id art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967)
(precluding recovery for that proportion of the injury attributable to a noncompensable pre-
existing disease or condition that is aggravated by the occupational disease).
55. Defendant sought the statutory definition, as it carefully defines "occupational dis-
ease" and excludes from this definition ordinary diseases of life to which one is exposed
outside of one's employment. Defendant contended that there was a factual issue about
whether plaintiffs disease was an ordinary disease of life. 579 S.W.2d at 82.
56. 578 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. HOUSTON CITY CHARTER art. 9, § 11.
58. 578 S.W.2d at 807.
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The case was reversed and rendered on appeal. The court held that the
ninety-day notice requirement of the ordinance was mandatory, that the
carrier's suit and claim were based upon the employee's claim, and that the
employee could not have maintained a third-party action because of his
failure to give the required notice to the city. Therefore, the carrier's claim
was likewise barred, even though its claim or cause of action may not have
not matured until the entry of the agreed judgment.5 9
Contributions to Second Injury Fund. Section 12c-2 of article 8306 creates
and provides for funding of the Second Injury Fund. Subsection (a) pro-
vides, in effect, that when injury to an employee results in death, and no
statutory beneficiaries survive the employee who are entitled to benefits
under the Act, the carrier shall pay death benefits to the Board for the
benefit of the fund. Subsection (b)60 purports to regulate required pay-
ments and contributions to the fund, so as to insure an adequate fund to
meet required payments, and yet relieve the carriers of obligations to con-
tribute to the fund when its balance is adequate.
Section 12c-2 creates more questions than it answers. One of those
questions was addressed in Texas Industrial Accident Board v. Allstate In-
surance Co. 6 1 An employee injured on October 26, 1975, died as a result
of those injuries on December 4, 1975. The employee was not survived by
any person entitled to recover death benefits under the Act. On February
8, 1977, the Industrial Accident Board, convinced that no beneficiary sur-
vived, rendered an award against Allstate for the payment of appropriate
death benefits to the fund. Allstate appealed from the award. Allstate's
obligation to pay the fund depended upon the financial status of the fund
on a certain date. Deposits to the fund on December 12, 1975, reached an
amount in excess of $250,000,62 but on that date, various claims were
59. Id at 808-09. See generally Reliance Ins. Co. v. Kronzer, Abraham & Watkins, 582
S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ) (attorney's fees disallowed
on a third party claim brought after effective date of 1973 amendment to art. 8307, § 6a,
when injury occurred before effective date).
60. The 1979 amendments increased the dollar amounts appearing in the subsection,
and altered to some extent the wording regarding "liabilities," but otherwise left the sub-
stance of the provision unchanged. See discussion in text accompanying footnote 4 supra.
For the purpose of discussing and understanding the cases in this section of the survey, the
following is the pre-1979 wording of art. 8306, § 12c-2(b):
[Wihen the total amount of all such payments into the Fund, together with
the accumulated interest thereon, equals or exceeds Two Hundred Fifty Thou-
sand Dollars ($250,000) in excess of existing liabilities, no further payments
shall be required to be paid to said Fund; but whenever thereafter the amount
of such Fund shall be reduced below One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand
Dollars ($125,000) by reason of payments from such Fund, the payments to
such Fund shall be resumed forthwith, and shall continue until such Fund
again amounts to Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) including
accumulated interest thereon.
1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 316, at 1258.
61. 570 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
62. The first clause of former subsection (b) of art. 8306, § 12c-2 stated: "When the
total amount of such payments into the Fund, together with the accumulated interest
thereon, equals or exceeds Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) in excess of
existing liabilities, no further payments shall be required to be paid to said Fund .... "
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pending against the fund. Only one of those claims had been finally deter-
mined. That claim would not have reduced the balance in the fund to an
amount less than $250,000. There were additional undetermined claims of
over $84,000, however, that could have reduced the balance to an amount
less than $250,000. The issue before the court was whether or not pending
and undetermined claims against the fund constituted "existing liabilities."
The Waco court of civil appeals answered the question in the affirma-
tive. The court was principally concerned with ensuring that the fund's
capacity to meet claims that ultimately matured into final judgments
would not be jeopardized. Thus, a broad reading of the words "existing
liability" would assure the fund of having moneys on hand to meet all
claims against it. The statute is silent on the question of what date controls
the carrier's obligation to contribute. Is the financial condition of the fund
to be determined on the date of death, the date of the award, or the date of
trial? The Allstate opinion does not address this question.
One solution to this question lies in construing the two clauses of subsec-
tion (b) together and reconciling them, if possible. The second clause of
subsection (b) states: "but' whenever thereafter the amount of such Fund
shall be reduced below One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars
($125,000.00) by reason of payments from such Fund, the payments to
such Fund shall be resumed forthwith, and shall continue until such Fund
again amounts to Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars .... ,,63
Together, the two clauses suggest that payments to the fund are required
until the balance in the fund reaches $250,000 in excess of existing liabili-
ties. Once that figure is reached, however, contributions to the fund are
suspended until disbursements reduce the fund's balance below
$125,000.64 At that time, mandatory payments and contributions to the
fund are resumed until the fund again reaches a balance of $250,000 in
excess of existing liabilities. In cases arising under this statute, therefore,
discovery would be pertinent to determine whether the net balance in the
fund has ever exceeded $250,000. If it has not, contributions must be con-
tinued until the net balance does exceed $250,000. If, on the other hand,
the net balance of the fund has ever reached $250,000, contributions to the
fund should be suspended until the net balance in the fund falls below
$125,000. The latter event would trigger the carriers' obligation to resume
contributions to the fund. The Allstate opinion does not address this point,
and seems to concern itself only with the $250,000 figure appearing in the
first clause of subsection (b).
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Second Injury Fund65 sev-
eral beneficiaries filed claims for death benefits that were contested by the
The 1979 amendment changed the $250,000 figure to $750,000. In addition, the 1979
amendment substituted for "in excess of existing liabilities," the phrase "in excess of liabili-
ties, whether vested or contingent, known to the Board." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8306, § 12c-2 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
63. Id.
64. The 1979 amendment changed this figure to $300,000.
65. 584 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
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carrier. The carrier appealed from an award rendered by the Board nam-
ing the decedent's estranged wife, his adult sons, and the Second Injury
Fund as defendants. Upon trial, the jury determined that the wife had
abandoned the employee without good cause, and was not entitled to re-
cover. The jury further found that the adult sons were not dependents and
were not entitled to recover.66 The trial court then rendered judgment for
lump sum recovery by the Second Injury Fund.67 The carrier appealed.
The Beaumont court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment in
favor of the carrier. The court held that the fund had the burden of prov-
ing two essential facts: (1) the deceased was not survived by beneficiaries
entitled to receive death benefits; and (2) there was not a sum of $250,000,
or more, in excess of existing liabilities in the fund.68 Since the fund had
not altered or amended its answers to interrogatories filed in June 1978,
which indicated that the net balance of the fund was in excess of $250,000,
it was bound by that figure for all purposes.69 Again, the court did not
address the question of the controlling date of the status of the fund. In
addition, the court assumed that the $250,000 figure is the only critical
figure for determining the carrier's obligation to contribute.
Notice of Intent to Appeal. Article 8307, section 570 requires any party dis-
satisfied with any final ruling, decision, or award of the Board to file with
the Board a notice of intention to appeal. Prior to Ward v. Charter Oak
Fire Insurance Co. 71 the twenty-day requirement of the statute had been
held to be mandatory and jurisdictional and was strictly construed. Ward
converted the twenty-day time period into a thirty-day time period, if no-
tice of intent to appeal had been sent by first class mail in a properly ad-
dressed and stamped envelope to the Board one day or more before the
expiration of the twenty-day period and if it was thereafter received by the
Board within thirty days after the award. 72
66. These findings were not appealed.
67. Trial of the case occurred in August 1978. Pretrial discovery indicated that as of
June 1978 the fund had a net balance of $279,614.25. 584 S.W.2d at 527.
68. Id at 528.
69. Id at 527.
70. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
71. 579 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1979).
72. Id. at 910-11. In Ward plaintiff properly stamped and addressed her envelope six
days in advance of the deadline. The letter was erroneously returned due to insufficient
postage (though there was sufficient postage) on the day the notice was due. The notice
arrived two days after the due date.
Phillips v. City of Houston, 572 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ), de-
cided before Ward, also dealt with the mailing of notice of intent to appeal within the 20-
day period and apparent receipt of the notice by the Board after 20 but within 30 days. The
employer, self-insured under the terms of the Act, filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the trial
court on the basis of a letter from the Board indicating notice of appeal was received 22 days
after the Board decision. The trial court heard no evidence on the plea, but sustained it and
dismissed the case. The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded because the letter
from the Board was deemed inadmissible; thus, the employer failed to establish properly
that the notice was late. This issue is now moot due to the Ward decision.
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Good Cause-Late Notice or Claim. Article 8307, section 4a73 requires
knowledge or notice to the carrier or subscriber within thirty days of the
occurrence of an injury, and requires the filing of a claim with the Board
within six months of the occurrence of an injury. For "good cause" the
time for giving notice and filing a claim may be extended. A reasonable
belief by the employee that the injury is trivial and will not result in exten-
sive or prolonged incapacity may be considered as a good cause for de-
layed filing of a claim. Despite a stated belief that the injury is trivial, an
employee cannot ignore, however, continuous difficulty and incapacity
from an injury for almost five years and still support a good cause conten-
tion. That was the decision in Wishert v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty
Insurance Co.74 In Wishert the employee sustained an injury to her hand
in March 1972 that resulted in prompt difficulty with the hand and caused
her to seek medical attention. The doctors told her that the injury would
simply take time to heal, that she would eventually be all right, that she
should "take it easy," but that she could resume work. Following her re-
lease from the doctors' care after a reasonably short period of time, the
employee attempted to return to work, found that she was unable to do the
work, and quit. She worked off and on during the next few years, exper-
iencing occasional difficulty with her hand. She eventually consulted a
lawyer in January 1977, and filed a claim. Testimony indicated that a
claims representative of the carrier had told the claimant shortly after the
injury that he would "take care of everything," and that the doctors told
her that she would be all right and could resume work. Despite this testi-
mony, a summary judgment for the defendant was sustained on the
grounds that, as a matter of law, good cause had not existed continuously
up until the time of actual filing. 75 The court stated that the evidence did
not establish that the claimant had exercised the diligence that a reason-
ably prudent person would have exercised in such circumstances.
76
In Adams v. Texas Compensation Insurance Co. 77 a jury trial resulted in
a judgment for the carrier because of the refusal of the jury to find good
cause justifying the claimant's failure to give the employer notice of the
injury within thirty days. No issue was submitted with regard to notice,
although the jury did find that during the six months after the injury the
claimant believed that his injury was trivial. The latter finding was suffi-
cient to support good cause for delayed filing of the claim, and plaintiff
sought to use the same finding to supply good cause for failure to give
notice of the injury. That contention was rejected. 78 A reasonable belief
that the injury is trivial may constitute good cause for delayed notice to the
employer or carrier within thirty days of the injury, but that issue is en-
73. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
74. 579 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
75. Id at 519. The court assumed, without deciding, that good cause did exist until July
1976, the time at which she began to have serious difficulty grasping glasses. Even so, there
was a six-month interval before a claim was filed.
76. Id
77. 573 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
78. Id at 613.
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tirely different from the issue submitted respecting the delayed filing of the
claim and must be submitted as a separate issue to the jury.
Wrongful Discharge-Discrimination Suits. Article 8307c 79 creates a cause
of action for damages and reinstatement when an employee has been dis-
charged from employment or discriminated against because the employee
has, in good faith, filed and prosecuted a claim for compensation benefits.
In A.J Foyt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jacobs80 the appellate court affirmed a non-
jury judgment in favor of the employee. Among the trial court's findings
of fact was that during the seventy-seven weeks following the plaintiffs
discharge, the plaintiff "made only a minimal effort to obtain other em-
ployment." The appellate court held that this finding was not equivalent
to a finding that the employee had "failed to use reasonable diligence" to
find other employment, and thus rejected the employer's attack of the
judgment on that basis.8 ' The employer also attacked the award of dam-
ages because the plaintiffs earnings following discharge were not deducted
from nor offset against his claimed loss. The court pointed out that the
employer had the burden of proving what sums the plaintiff earned or
could have earned after discharge, in mitigation of his claimed damages,
but had failed to do so.82
Suits to Set Aside Awards. Article 8307, section 583 requires that any party
dissatisfied with an award or other final ruling or decision of the Board,
after having given timely notice of intent to appeal, institute suit within
twenty days of the filing of such notice. In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v.
LaCoke84 the carrier's suit was "file marked" by the district clerk's office
on the twenty-first day following carrier's notice of intent to appeal. The
evidence showed, however, that all incoming mail was routed to the VIM
Room post office substation at the Dallas County Records Building. The
carrier's petition arrived in the VIM Room on June 3, the twentieth day
following the filing of notice in time to make the customary 11:00 a.m.
delivery to the various county offices the same day. Unknown to the dis-
trict clerk and to the carrier, a deputy ditrict clerk had instructed the VIM
Room to hold the 11:00 a.m. delivery until the following morning. This
resulted in the carrier's petition arriving at the district clerk's office, for
actual filing, one day late.
The supreme court held that an instrument is deemed in law to be filed
at the time it is left with the clerk, regardless of a "file mark."'85 The court
79. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
80. 578 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, no writ).
81. Id at 447.
82. Id In the only other survey year case, Schrader v. ARTCO Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d
534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no writ), the court upheld jury findings of
wrongful discharge and damages, but upheld a j.n.o.v. finding that claimant had not proven
he could return to work and thus was not entitled to reinstatement.
83. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
84. 585 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979).
85. Id at 681.
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then concluded that there could be no doubt that the carrier's petition was
within the effective control of the district clerk, even though not within his
actual physical possession. The court observed that the petition would
have been delivered to the clerk's office on time but for the act of the dep-
uty; therefore, the cause of the delay was solely the deputy district clerk's
act. The court concluded, therefore, that the carrier's petition should be
deemed in law to be timely filed.
8 6
The court stated that although the twenty-day rule with regard to filing
suit was mandatory and jurisdictional, the Ward87 decision had "relaxed"
the strictness of the notice rule by applying a rule of law similar to rule 5,
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 88 The court stated that there was no need
to adopt the Ward rationale here because of its conclusion that the petition
was timely filed.89 This language would appear to suggest, though, that in
a proper case the supreme court will apply the Ward rationale to the late
filing of a petition, as it did to the late filing of a notice of intent to appeal.
Prior Injuries. Article 8306, section 12c9° was amended in 1977 to restore
it substantially to its pre-1971 amendment status. The section deals with
the effect of previous injuries on subsequent claims. The courts have held
that prior to 1971 and after 1977 the carrier, in certain cases, is entitled to a
reduction of liability to the extent that a prior general injury contributes to
incapacity. 9' The 1971 amendment abolished that rule during the 1971 to
1977 period.92 Although the claimant in Lubbock Independent School Dis-
trict v. Bradley93 was injured prior to the effective date of the 1977 amend-
ment, the case was tried after the effective date of that amendment. The
employer argued that the 1977 amendment should be applied retroactively
and thus the trial court should have submitted issues on the extent to
which a previous injury contributed to the present incapacity. The court
rejected the argument, holding that the 1977 amendment effected substan-
tive changes and not merely procedural or remedial ones.94
Causal Connection-Heart Attacks and Strokes. Three cases involving
heart attacks or strokes reported during the survey year demonstrate vary-
ing treatments of the required medical testimony standard of "reasonable
medical probability" that the work-related event is a producing cause of
86. Id
87. See note 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
88. Rule 5 allows an act to be done after the expiration of a specified period where good
cause is shown for failure to act. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
89. 585 S.W.2d at 680.
90. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
91. See Lubbock Independent School Dist. v. Bradley, 579 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graves, 573 S.W.2d 249,
25 1-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Haunschild, 527 S.W.2d 270, 271-72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 316, § 1, at 1257-58 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 12c).
93. 579 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. Id. at 80.
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the injury. In Stodghill v. Texas Employers Insurance Association95 the car-
rier argued that there was no evidence that a fall from a rig floor was a
producing cause of death from a myocardial infarction that occurred six or
seven weeks later. The employee, while at work, fell fifteen feet from a rig
floor to the ground, suffering a broken arm near the wrist, a low back in-
jury, and various bruises. While hospitalized for these injuries, he was
found to be suffering from hypertension. The doctors treated the injuries
as well as the hypertension. The high blood pressure was never brought
under control, and the plaintiff died at home from a myocardial infarction
some six weeks after the injury, never having returned to work.
The court quoted the medical testimony at length, and concluded that
the substance of the doctor's testimony was that it was probable that stress
caused by the injuries, acting upon the hypertension, was a producing
cause of the employee's death.96 The court treated the case as one in
which the record contains medical testimony of a probable causal connec-
tion between the accidental injuries on the job and the eventual death from
heart attack. The court expressly distinguished this case from those in
which the causal connection must be inferred by the jury from general
experience or common sense.97
A more tenuous causal link was upheld in Transport Insurance Co. v.
Campbell.98 In Campbell an employee truck driver was removing a mud
flap when his wrench slipped and he toppled backward, bumping his head
on a nearby trailer dolly. A small knot arose on his head, although the
force of the blow did not break the skin. There was no loss of conscious-
ness, no dizziness, and no nausea. He continued to work. The truck repair
was completed, and the employee continued his journey, driving an addi-
tional fifty miles, then stopping overnight at a motel. He experienced no
immediate physical difficulties, but when he arose the following morning
he had a slight headache, perhaps a result of bumping his head. During
breakfast the employee noticed that he was losing control of his hand, and
a short time later paralysis occurred in his side and leg, causing him to fall.
At the hospital he was diagnosed as having experienced some type of cere-
bral vascular accident. Approximately eight to ten hours had intervened
between the bump on his head and the appearance of symptoms of paraly-
sis.
Three doctors who testified agreed that high blood pressure or high
blood pressure and hardening of the arteries was the probable cause of the
stroke. There was no medical testimony of a probable causal relationship
between the bump on the head and the subsequent stroke. All three doc-
tors recognized the possibility that the bump on the head could have
caused the stroke, but they characterized the possibility of such a causal
connection as "highly unlikely," "extremely remote," and the "least likely"
95. 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1979).
96. Id at 105-06.
97. Id at 105.
98. 582 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of all possible causes. 99 A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff
for total and permanent incapacity. The carrier appealed, attacking the
legal and factual sufficiency of evidence of causal connection between the
blow to the plaintiffs head and the subsequent disability from stroke.
The court of civil appeals at first had reversed and rendered for the car-
rier, writing a persuasive opinion holding that there was no evidence of
causal relationship between the accident and the subsequent stroke.100 On
rehearing, however, the court reversed itself'0 ' and held that there was
some evidence to support producing cause, and that the jury answer was
not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.' 0 2 In do-
ing so, the court relied upon Insurance Co. of North America v. Kneten. 0 3
Kneten does not seem to offer adequate support for the court's ruling. In
Kneten recovery was allowed to the victim of a heart attack, despite testi-
mony stating that the employee was predisposed to a heart attack."°4 Evi-
dence of causation showed that the employee was hot and sweaty from
work after exerting himself considerably by working with an electric drill
above his head. The employee climbed a ladder, received an electric
shock, and became seriously ill very soon thereafter. Kneten's majority
opinion does not clearly state whether the employee's recovery was based
on the conclusion that medical testimony in the case rose to the level of
"reasonable medical probability," or whether the circumstances of the case
permitted the jury to find causal connection between the event and the
attack, without the necessity of, or despite, ambiguous medical testimony.
Even if Kneten were decided on the latter ground, the circumstances differ
factually from Campbell. In Campbell the employee sustained what was
apparently a minor bump on the head, and eight to ten hours passed, dur-
ing which there were no symptoms or apparent consequences of the blow,
suggesting that it is improper to allow the jury to make causal inferences
upon such loosely connected circumstantial evidence. 105
The supreme court addressed this issue in Western Casualty & Surety Co.
v. Gonzales:' 6 "[T]his Court has required medical expert opinion for the
proof of causation, to link an act or condition or trauma with a subsequent
physical disease or condition, when that relationship is beyond the com-
mon knowledge and experience of laypeople."' 10 7 Further, the court
stated: "If the medical causation is highly uncertain to the layman, we
99. Id. at 176-77.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 177.
102. Id. at 178.
103. 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969).
104. Id. at 55-56 (Greenhill, J., concurring).
105. Note especially that the Kneten court stressed the time element: "Since the question
is what precipitated this attack at this time, it requires no expert to decide the probabilities
when the trier of fact is given evidence of prompt onset of the attack following an occurrence
competent to affect adversely a defective heart." Id at 54. In Campbell there was an eight-
to ten-hour delay before the stroke, and the medical testimony indicated that such a causal
link was merely a possibility.
106. 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975).
107. Id. at 526.
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require that a medical expert apply his learning and experience to the par-
ticular case and give an opinion as to whether, at least more likely than
not, a cause produced an effect."' 08
The holding in Campbell runs counter to the supreme court's pro-
nouncements and permits the jury to draw its findings from circumstances,
even when the medical testimony supported only a possibility, not a
probability, of a causal connection. This opinion is an example of a court's
discounting expert medical opinion in an area of obviously questionable
causation, and allowing the jury to substitute its own conclusions when
medical evidence is absent. Clearly, the case is not one in which circum-
stances permit common sense and general lay experience to rise above
mere speculation. Unfortunately, the court has fallen into the error of
adopting the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc.' 0 9
In Jackson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. I 10 the employee, a long-haul
truck driver, was scheduled to leave for Arizona at 1:00 a.m. on November
19, 1974. He reported to his departure point at 12:30 a.m. and was doing
preliminary paperwork when he became ill with what later was deter-
mined to be a heart attack. He returned to his home and did not work
thereafter. On December 25 he suffered another heart attack and died. A
jury found that the employee suffered a heart attack on November 19, that
the heart attack occurred in the course of employment, and that the heart
attack of November 19 was a producing cause of the employee's death in
December. The trial court rendered judgment, n.o.v., for the carrier. The
court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment.
Plaintiff argued that section 20 of article 8306"' no longer requires evi-
dence of a "particular strain, exertion or other precipitating event."" 12 In-
stead, plaintiff argued, the decedent's occupation was a stressful one, and a
heart attack could be precipitated or produced by this line of work. Sev-
eral doctors had testified that the employee's occupation was mentally and
emotionally stressful and that stress could trigger a heart attack in a person
with vascular disease. In affirming the judgment for the defendant, the
court of civil appeals observed that the evidence in the case showed a gen-
eral job description, and that the job of truck driving was stressful. There
was no evidence, however, of a "particular strain, exertion or other precip-
itating event traceable to a definite time, place and cause."'"1 3 The court
firmly rejected the notion that a stressful occupation will suffice.
Extension of Injuries-Speeifc to General. Few areas of compensation
practice have been more troublesome, both substantively and procedur-
ally, than the area of extension of specific injuries into general injuries.
108. Id at 527.
109. "After this, therefore, because of this." (The fallacy of arguing from temporal se-
quence to a causal relationship.)
110. 580 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).




The problems have been encountered in pleadings, evidence, and special
issue submission. Unfortunately, no end is in sight to the questions that
continue to arise in this field.
The customary (and safe) form of submission inquires whether the in-
jury to the specific member extends to and affects some specified part of
the body, other than the specific member, thereby causing incapacity. In
Texas Employers'Insurance Association v. Eskue," 1 4 the special issue asked
if the injury extended to and affected plaintiffs "general health thereby
producing incapacity to the body generally."" 5 The appellate court re-
versed and remanded the case on other grounds, but Justice Osborn, in a
concurring opinion, questioned the propriety of the general health inquiry.
In doing so he reviewed a number of conflicting supreme court cases" 16
and perceptively concluded that the question simply cannot be resolved.' 'i
The Eskue case also considered, although not in depth, possible exten-
sion of a specific injury of the leg or foot to an arm or shoulder, when the
use of crutches, necessitated by the leg injury, may have resulted in some
injury to the arm or shoulder. The court accepted the argument that evi-
dence of an arm injury incurred through the use of crutches was some
evidence of an extension." 8
Agreed Judgment-Claim for Future Medical Services. In Kinsey v. North-
ern Insurance Co. 119 the employee and carrier by agreed judgment com-
promised and settled a claim for compensation in 1972. The settlement
and judgment provided for a cash payment and necessary future medical
services for two years. Thereafter, during the agreed two-year term, plain-
tiff requested medical treatment, which the carrier refused to provide. The
plaintiff filed suit because of the alleged wrongful refusal of the carrier to
comply with the terms of the settlement. The carrier raised a threshold
question about the employee's failure first to process his claim for medical
services through the Board, arguing that compliance with the "exclusive
remedy" clause of the Act' 20 is a condition precedent to the court's juris-
diction.
114. 574 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
115. Id at 816.
116. Compare Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 506 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1974), aff'd, 518 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex. 1975) ("If the injury to the particular
member extends to and affects portions of the body beyond the member, or if his general
health is impaired, the workman may recover for his general disability .... "), with Travel-
ers Ins. Co. v. Marmolejo, 544 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1976) (fact that injury to a specific member
has affected body generally is not enough to recover for general disability), and Texas Em-
ployers' Ins. Ass'n v. Espinosa, 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1963) (headaches, pain and dizziness
following an injury do not of themselves establish an extension of a specific injury to the
body generally). Justice Osborn pointed out that the cases relied upon by the supreme court
to support the quoted statement in Gonzales do not, in fact, support the statement. 574
S.W.2d at 819. Similar statements regarding impairment of general health appear in Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Wilson, 522 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1975).
117. 574 S.W.2d at 819-21.
118. Id at 818.
119. 577 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
120. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
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Without setting out the terms and provisions of the agreed judgment, the
court held that once the matter was reduced to an agreed judgment, only a
court, and not the Industrial Accident Board, had jurisdiction to enforce or
implement the agreement of the parties. It further held that in all such
cases no further action by the Board is required.' 2' The court probably
went further in its opinion than was reasonably necessary to dispose of the
controversy. Certainly, the language of the opinion is dictum except to the
extent that it construes the effect of the particular judgment in question.
An examination of the record in the case revealed that the judgment in
question stated that:
[Jludgment should be entered herein in favor of the Plaintiff and
against the Defendant for the sum of SIX THOUSAND DOLLARS
($6,000.00) andfor any and all medical expenses incurred by Plaintiffor
injuries arising out of the occurrence made the basis of this suit from
[sic] two years from entry of this judgment .... 122
The judgment continued: "It is further ordered . . . that the Plaintiff do
have and recover of and from the Defendant, future medical aid, hospital
services, nursing, chiropractic services, medicines, and rehabilitation bene-
fits incurred from [sic] two years from the date of this judgment."'' 23
This language fails to reflect any intention of the parties that Board ac-
tion will be required respecting future medical services. In fact, the lan-
guage of the judgment could be argued to be broader than the provisions
of the Act with regard to medical services. The court's action can probably
be justified because of the terms of the judgment. Nothing should prohibit
settling parties from agreeing, however, that all the terms and provisions of
the Act should continue in force regarding future medical treatment. 24
Wage Rate. Article 8309, section 1125 defines "average weekly wages" as
"three hundred (300) times the average daily wage or salary which he shall
have earned during the days that he actually worked in such year, divided
by fifty-two (52)."126 The section also states that "wages" shall include the
"market value of board, lodging, laundry, fuel, and other advantage which
can be estimated in money which the employee receives from the employer
as a part of his remuneration."'' 27
In Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Beaty 128 the workman actually
worked a total of 212 days. He received payments totalling $15,416.61.
This total remuneration included, however, payment for fifteen days of
sick leave or disability, nine days of paid holidays, and four weeks of paid
121. 577 S.W.2d at 355.
122. Final Judgment at 1, Kinsey v. Northern Ins. Co., No. 55-365A (Dist. Ct. of Brazo-
ria County, 149th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Mar. 17, 1972) (emphasis added).
123. Id at 3.
124. The court impliedly recognized this proposition by expressly stating that the carrier
waived the Act. 577 S.W.2d at 355.
125. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
126. Id (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. 576 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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vacation. The defendant contended, in effect, that for determination of
average daily wages, the total amount of money paid to the employee dur-
ing the year should be reduced to the amount "earned" by the employee
on the days he "actually worked" by deducting the pay for disability, holi-
days, and vacations. The court rejected this contention and held, as a mat-
ter of law, that earnings were to include benefits such as disability,
vacation pay, and holiday pay. The court simply divided the total mone-
tary payments for the year by the number of days actually worked, rather
than by the total days for which he received pay, including disability and
vacation time.' 29
The statute is ambiguous in referring to "earned during the days that he
actually worked." Does the statute mean actual paid earnings for days
actually worked, or may an employee be said to have "earned" on days of
actual work such additional benefits as vacation pay, disability pay, and
holiday pay? Strangely, the Beaty court cites Morris v. Transport Insurance
Co. 130 to support its decision. Although also dividing total earnings by the
number of days actually worked, the Morris court stated: "No one con-
tends that the gross amount earned . . . should have been divided by the
number of days for which plaintiff was paid ...[as contrasted to days
actually worked] ...and we express no opinion on the question."' 31
Lubbock Independent School District v. Bradley132 examined wage rate
questions arising from work that is inherently part-time. In Bradley the
injured employee worked in the school cafeteria five hours a day, five days
a week, during the nine-month school year. She worked fewer than 210
days during the year immediately prior to the injury. The employee's
wage rate was calculated under subdivision (2)133 on the basis of a full-
time "employee of the same class." The comparable employee was a full-
time, year-round employee of a commercial cafeteria in the city of Lub-
bock. The appellate court approved of this comparison, on the grounds
that the Act seeks to compensate for lost or reduced earning capacity and
not merely loss of earnings. 134 Thus, the courts have had little difficulty in
calculating the average weekly wage of part-time employees by resort to
the wages of full-time employees. 135
There are few guidelines, however, as to who is or is not "an employee
of the same class." A carpenter and a carpenter's helper are not in the
same class. 136 A millwright is not in the same class as a pipe fitter. 137 In
129. Id. at 482.
130. 487 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. Id. at 782 n.*.
132. 579 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
133. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967).
134. 579 S.W.2d at 81.
135. See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McMahon, 509 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Nored, 341 S.W.2d 492
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
136. Garcia v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 542 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,
no writ).
137. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Steadman, 415 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the drilling industry, a "floor hand" and a "swamper" may be in the same
class, but they are different from a "unit operator."' 138 There is no require-
ment that the work be exactly alike, so long as the work done by each is
"substantially the same" or work of the "same type."' 39 A mere wage rate
difference, or even the fact that one trucker is paid on a load basis, and
another by the hour, does not mean that they are not of the same class.' 40
Death Benefits-Claim. In Gayler v. Renfro 14 1 an adult, unmarried em-
ployee died as a result of injuries received in the course of employment.
The deceased's parents were both living but had been divorced for many
years. The father never filed a claim with the Board, although the mother
filed a claim listing only herself as beneficiary, but also reciting that the
claim for benefits was made "in behalf of and for each and all of the legal
Beneficiaries of the deceased." 142 Apparently the father's existence some-
how became known to the Board, since at the time of award only half the
death benefits were made to the mother, pursuant to a compromise settle-
ment agreement. The mother then filed a second claim for benefits, listing
herself and the father as beneficiaries, but reciting that it was filed only on
behalf of herself. The second claim resulted in an award for the remaining
half of the death benefits to be paid to the father. The mother appealed
that award, and on appeal the carrier interpleaded the father.
The mother's principal contention on appeal was that since the father
had never filed a timely claim for death benefits, all benefits should be
payable to her. The trial court rejected the mother's contention and
awarded half the death benefits to the father. The court of appeals af-
firmed, observing that the statute does not require that each and every
beneficiary file a claim. A claim filed by one beneficiary on behalf of all
other beneficiaries qualifies as a timely claim on behalf of all beneficiaries.
The second claim, listing the mother and the father as beneficiaries was
sufficient to inform the Board who the beneficiaries were. These two fac-
tors satisfied the Board's jurisdictional requirements. 43
Inconsistent Claims-Compensation and Group Insurance. In Aetna Life In-
surance Co. v. Bocanegra'44 the employee sought to assert a claim against
a group health carrier after having previously claimed compensation bene-
138. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 356 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962,
writ refd n.r.e.).
139. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mesta, 435 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1968), writ ref'dn.r.e., 438 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1969); Pan Am. Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 370 S.W.2d
955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Butler,
287 S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
140. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McMahon, 509 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 420 S.W.2d 760, 765-66
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Jordan, 410
S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, no writ).
141. 576 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
142. Id at 912.
143. Id at 913.
144. 572 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ granted).
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fits. Recovery was denied because of the prior inconsistent claim that the




Hospital Records-Sufficiency of Objection-Causation. In Hurtado v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Association 45 the supreme court directed its
attention to evidence questions that are frequently encountered in the trial
of personal injury cases. The claimant in Hurtado alleged an injury or an
aggravation of a preexisting condition. The carrier alleged both prior and
subsequent injuries and conditions as the sole cause of any existing inca-
pacity. During the trial the defendant offered into evidence four exhibits
containing the employee's complete medical and hospital records from
various institutions. When the records were offered, plaintiffs counsel
made a general objection that the records included hearsay, conclusions,
and matters of opinion. Counsel further argued that it was incumbent on
the party offering the exhibit to select the admissible parts rather than
placing the burden upon the objecting party to point out unacceptable or
inadmissible parts. Plaintiffs counsel did not rest on his general objection
but also specifically pointed out to the trial court a number of examples
within the exhibits that were the subject of his objections. The objections
were overruled.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment against the
plaintiff on the basis of the jury's refusal to find that the injury was a pro-
ducing cause of incapacity. The supreme court reversed, observing that
claimant's counsel had sufficiently directed the attention of the trial court
to particular inadmissible portions of the records. The objecting party was
not required to examine each page of the voluminous exhibits and segre-
gate all of the inadmissible items from the admissible ones. 146
Having found that the objection was properly made, the court then di-
rected its attention to the contents of the medical records and to certain
features of the records that the court considered inadmissible and harmful.
It is difficult to understand precisely whether the court is suggesting that
the records were inadmissible as hearsay or because they were irrelevant to
the issue of causation. The exhibits reflected the claimant's history of
health problems with diabetes, arthritis, and a prior back injury. Admit-
tedly, the voluminous records included hearsay evidence such as letters
from various doctors, consultation reports, and disability evaluation re-
ports involving conditions and injuries other than the injury in issue.
However, in commenting upon the admissibility of the records, the court
stated:
[T]here was no showing, and it does not appear from the records
145. 574 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. 1978).
146. Id at 539.
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themselves, that the statements, findings, and opinions contained
therein were directed to the question of causation, that is, whether the
injury allegedly suffered by Hurtado aggravated his pre-existing con-
dition of arthritis and diabetes. The medical findings appearing in the
records pertained to the physical state or condition of Hurtado at the
times of the medical examinations, treatments or hospitalization; they
were not intended to speak to, or to be determinative of, the question
of whether such state or condition was caused or aggravated by
Hurtado's alleged injury while at work. Evidence upon the issue of cau-
sation is to be offered and received in an admissible manner, including
the opportunity of cross-examination of any witness whose statements,
opinions or conclusions relate thereto. 147
The court continued:
An inference could have been drawn by the jury from the medical
records that the incapacity claimed by Hurtado was entirely attributa-
ble to the pre-existing diseases and prior back injury . . . when, as
pointed out above, none of the medical findings were directed to the
question of an injury-induced incapacity resulting from an aggrava-
tion of Hurtado's pre-existing state of health. 48
The result reached in Hurtado appears to be correct. The records in
question contained letters and correspondence between doctors, between
doctors and employers, and between doctors and the Texas Rehabilitation
Commission. Serious questions are raised, however, about the admissibil-
ity of records containing a mixture of opinions, diagnoses, and matters of
causation.
Admissibility of Prior Criminal Record. Two cases during the survey year
examined the admissibility of the claimant's prior criminal record. In Brit-
ish American Insurance Co. v. Coffman,149 the court of civil appeals re-
versed a trial court judgment for the plaintiff because of the refusal of the
trial court to admit the claimant's very recent pleas of guilty to possession
of heroin and to theft. The court held that both offenses involved moral
turpitude, that they were admissible, and that the exclusion of the evidence
was an abuse of discretion.150
In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Evans' 5' the claimant denied, in
answers to interrogatories, any prior criminal offenses other than traffic
violations. In fact, approximately fifteen months prior to the claimed in-
jury and approximately three years prior to the date of trial of the compen-
sation case, he had been convicted of a misdemeanor for knowingly
claiming and collecting unemployment compensation benefits when he
had not worked or earned wages. Holding the introduction of the convic-
tion admissible for impeachment purposes, the court stated that execution
of the false affidavit was a criminal act of intentional dishonesty for the
147. Id (emphasis added).
148. Id at 540.
149. 574 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ).
150. Id at 874.
151. 577 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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purpose of personal gain, and thus involved a question of moral turpi-
tude.' 52 Further exclusion of this evidence constituted reversible error.
Suit to Set Aside Settlement Agreement. In Kolb v. Texas Employers' Insur-
ance Association 53 the claimaint, represented by an attorney, entered into
a settlement agreement with the carrier at a prehearing conference. He
later filed suit to set aside the settlement agreement, alleging that he had
relied upon representations of various doctors who were the carrier's
"agents," and that those representations had been false. The doctors had
told him that his injury was not serious when, in fact, it turned out to be a
serious and disabling condition. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the carrier after striking the plaintiff's affidavit filed in opposition
to the summary judgment motion, because it was presented two months
after the filing of the motion and was served on the carrier's attorney only
three days prior to the hearing.
The court of civil appeals reversed the summary judgment, concluding
that the plaintiffs oral deposition testimony did not conclusively exclude
his reliance on representations made by the defendant's doctors, and upon
the further ground that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the
plaintiff's affidavit.' 54
Res Gestae. In Deering v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association 55 a se-
curity guard allegedly sustained a specific injury to his leg that caused
blood clots to develop or break loose and block the flow of blood to the
leg, requiring eventual amputation of the leg. The employee died of hepa-
titis shortly after the surgery, allegedly contracted from contaminated
blood received in the course of surgery. The jury did not find that an
injury had occurred on the job. On appeal, the plaintiffs complained that
the trial court had erred in excluding the testimony of a fellow employee
who would have testified that the injured employee told him, on the job,
about the time of the claimed accident, that he had "bumped his leg back
there."156 The appellate court held that the exclusion of the statement was
proper. The "exciting event" needed to make the statement res gestae
could not be shown or established by the statement itself. Independent
evidence of the event was required. Likewise, the alleged statement was
not admissible as a statement of present physical condition since it was
descriptive of external events that caused the injury and was offered to
prove the cause of injury.' 57
Estoppel. In Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Lee15 8 the employee sustained
152. Id at 515-16.
153. 585 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
154. Id at 872-73.
155. 582 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. Id at 613.
157. Id at 614.
158. 570 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978), writ ref'dn.r.e. per curiam, 584
S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1979).
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an injury on December 26, 1973, and a subsequent injury on October 1,
1975, while working for the same employer. Two separate claims were
filed for total and permanent incapacity. A trial based on the October
1975 injury resulted in recovery of total and permanent disability benefits.
The December 1973 injury (the instant case) was tried and likewise re-
sulted in a verdict for total and permanent benefits. The carrier argued on
appeal of the decision involving the 1973 injury that the employee's recov-
ery for total and permanent incapacity ought to be barred by the em-
ployee's testimony in the former trial that his incapacity was caused solely
by the October 1975 injury. The carrier contended that this constituted a
judicial estoppel and that the trial court erred in excluding the introduc-
tion of the plaintiff's former testimony on that subject. The court of civil
appeals sustained both points in reversing and remanding the case. 159
The supreme court originally affirmed the reversal, refusing the applica-
tion for writ of error, no reversible error. Then, on rehearing, by per
curiam opinion, the supreme court reaffirmed its action, but expressly dis-
approved the language of the lower court regarding the estoppel.' 60 The
reason for the court's statement and action is not entirely clear. First, the
testimony of the plaintiff in the former trial may not have been a clear and
unequivocal statement that the 1975 injury was the sole cause of this inca-
pacity. However, the supreme court so characterized the testimony: "At
the former trial he testified under oath that the 1975 injury was the sole
cause of his incapacity."' 61 Although the supreme court based its approval
of the reversal and remand of the case upon the improper exclusion of the
prior testimony, the court went further and stated: "[W]e disapprove the
language of the Court of Civil Appeals which states that Lee's evidence in
the first trial that the 1975 injury produced his total and permanent inca-
pacity estops him from claiming permanent incapacity as a result of his
first injury."' 62 Referring to the statute governing the 1973 injury, 163 the
court attempted to explain this ruling: "[A] claimant could [then] recover
upon the basis of more than one claim for total and permanent incapacity.
For this reason we also disapprove the instruction by the Court of Civil
Appeals that upon remand, the retrial should be limited to the determina-
tion of any temporary incapacity that Lee suffered."' 164 This would appear
to be erroneous and confusing reasoning. Section 12c of article 8306 gov-
erns the effect of previous compensable injuries on the carrier's liability for
subsequent compensable injuries when both injuries contribute to the sub-
sequent, resulting incapacity. That section would not be involved in the
question of estoppel arising from a judicial admission. There is nothing
improper in permitting an injured employee to assert that successive inju-
ries each caused and contributed to separate periods of total and perma-
159. Id at 233-34.
160. 584 S.W.2d at 701.
161. Id at 700.
162. Id at 701.
163. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 316, § 12c, at 1257. See note 54 supra.
164. 584 S.W.2d at 701.
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nent incapacity, and in sustaining his recoveries for the same if he could
persuade juries so to find. It is a totally different matter, however, to per-
mit the employee, as in Lee, to testify in one trial that his incapacity is
caused solely by a particular injury, and then refuse to bar his subsequent
efforts to attribute the same incapacity to a different and preexisting cause.
In suggesting that the prior testimony should estop or bar the plaintiff in
the second trial, the court of civil appeals cited and relied on the opinion of
the supreme court in Long v. Knox, 165 which described judicial estoppel as
follows: "Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, as distinguished from
equitable estoppel by inconsistency, a party is estopped merely by the fact
of having alleged or admitted in his pleadings in a former proceeding
under oath the contrary to the assertion sought to be made."' 166 The court
might justify its holding in Lee by declining to extend the doctrine of judi-
cial estoppel from sworn pleadings to oral testimony. Its decision is not
supportable, however, by any construction or application of section 12c.
Admissibility ofAverage Weekly Wage. In Electric Mutual Liability Insur-
ance Co. v. WI"ite 167 the parties entered into a stipulation regarding aver-
age weekly wage. Then, at the plaintiffs request, the trial court excluded
from the hearing of the jury any evidence of the amount of average weekly
wage, including the stipulation. The jury found the average weekly wage
earning capacity to be $150. The defendant attacked the exclusion of evi-
dence of average weekly wage, contending that knowledge of the prior av-
erage weekly wage was pertinent and important to the jury's consideration
of reduction of earning capacity. The court of civil appeals held that ex-
clusion of average weekly wage was improper, and that the jury should
have had the benefit of that figure, but further ruled that exclusion of the
evidence did not require reversal of the case. 168
B. Special Issues
In Burns v. Union Standard Insurance Co. 169 the employee alleged that
she sustained injuries to her ankle, leg, hip, and back as a result of an
accident. The carrier alleged that the injury and resulting disability were
confined and limited to the foot and ankle. The trial court submitted an
issue 170 asking if the plaintiff received an injury which included injuries to
the hip and back, or whether such injury was confined to the foot and leg.
The jury found that the injuries were confined to the foot and leg. On
165. 155 Tex. 581, 291 S.W.2d 292 (1956).
166. Id at 585, 291 S.W.2d at 295 (emphasis added).
167. 579 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
168. Id at 948.
169. 580 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ granted). After the survey
period ended, the supreme court affirmed the court of civil appeals decision. 23 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 168 (Jan. 19, 1980).
170. The special issue stated: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
Plaintiff received an injury on or about September 30, 1974, which included her hip and
back, or was such injury confined to her left foot and leg below the knee?" 580 S.W.2d at
652.
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appeal, plaintiff attacked the form of submission, contending that the con-
finement portion of the issue was an inferential rebuttal inquiry, and that
plaintiff was entitled to an unrestricted general injury submission. The
court agreed that the disjunctive submission of confinement is, technically,
the submission of an inferential rebuttal matter. Nevertheless, the court
held that even though the submission was technically erroneous, it did not
amount to harmful error.
The plaintiff further contended that she intended to waive any recovery
for specific injuries and sought to recovery for general injuries or nothing
at all. Consistent with this position, plaintiff contended that the judgment
for specific injury recovery did not conform to the pleadings. The court of
civil appeals discussed the state of the plaintiffs pleadings and concluded
that the prayer for general relief was sufficient to create consistency be-
tween the specific injury judgment and the pleading. 171 How the entry of a
judgment for a recovery for specific injuries could amount to harmful error
to the plaintiff is difficult to imagine, when the only other option would
have been entry of a judgment that plaintiff take nothing.' 72
Following a number of prior decisions, Burton v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. 173 held that an irreconcilable conflict existed between a find-
ing of partial incapacity and a finding of average weekly wage earning
capacity that is greater than the employee's average weekly wage. This is a
continuing dilemma that follows inescapably in the wake of the supreme
court's decision that the average weekly wage constitutes, in law, the em-
ployee's earning capacity prior to injury. 174
C. Questions of Venue
Venue questions continue to plague parties and courts alike, and despite
the age of the Act and the volume of litigation construing it, final answers
in venue questions continue to be evasive. Articles 8307, section 5,175 and
8307a 176 contain general provisions regarding the venue rules for appeals
from awards, although disputes about venue have also arisen under article
8306, section 19,177 which governs extraterritorial injuries.
In Reyes v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association178 the carrier ap-
pealed from an award, filing suit in Robertson County, the county of in-
jury. Claimant filed a plea of privilege to be sued in Maverick County, his
county of residence. Because of a mistake in defense counsel's office, no
171. Id.
172. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Manning, 574 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978,
no writ), was another case involving a special issue submission. The issue directed the jury
to find the beginning date of total incapacity. The jury answered "Mar. 26, or 27, 1974." Id
at 239. The court held that this was an acceptable answer in light of the finding of total and
permanent incapacity and the nature of the evidence.
173. 582 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
174. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 441, 347 S.W.2d 605 (1961).
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
176. Id art. 8307a.
177. Id. art. 8306, § 19.
178. 581 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ dism'd).
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controverting plea was filed within the time allowed by the rules. The de-
fense counsel discovered the mistake shortly thereafter and filed a contro-
verting plea, accompanied by a motion attempting to set out good cause
for the late filing. After determining that good cause existed, the trial court
allowed the late filing of the controverting plea and overruled the plea of
privilege. On appeal, the carrier contended that venue in compensation
cases is governed by article 8307, section 5, and article 8307a and that gen-
eral venue rules regarding the privilege of being sued in the county of
one's residence had no application. The Waco court of civil appeals dis-
agreed, holding that a plea of privilege was a proper vehicle for challeng-
ing venue in a compensation case. The court concluded that good cause
did not exist and that the failure to properly controvert the plea resulted in
the fixing of venue. As a result, the court ordered that the case be trans-
ferred to Maverick County.179 All of this transpired despite the admitted
fact that suit was filed in the county of injury!
The Waco court based its decision in Reyes on Texas Highway Depart-
ment v. Jarrell'80 and Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Ellis.18'
Neither case is clear authority for the court's action. Jarrell was not a
compensation case at all, but was a suit to set aside a settlement agreement,
which is a common law action based on grounds of equity. The Ellis case
dealt with a construction of article 8306, section 19182 regarding an extra-
territorial injury, and the opinion did not expressly examine or consider
the questions of venue involved in article 8307, section 5 and 8307a.
Moreover, the Waco court made no mention of several cases, including
its own precedent, in venue for compensation cases. In Traders & General
Insurance Co. v. Curby,183 the claimant brought suit in Ellis County to set
aside an award of the Board. The carrier filed a plea of privilege, seeking
to transfer the case to Dallas County. Upon hearing, the employee testi-
fied that the accident had not occurred in Ellis County. The trial court
overruled the plea of privilege and retained venue. On appeal the Waco
court held that articles 8307, section 5, and 8307a were venue statutes, and
that venue in compensation cases was controlled by the Act rather than by
the general venue statutes.'8 4 The court further observed that the general
plea of privilege procedure was not the one to be followed, but that the
trial court, on its own motion or on motion of either party, should simply
transfer the case to the proper county upon learning that it was not insti-
tuted in a permissible county.' 85
The Reyes court also made no mention of Texas Employers' Insurance
Association v. Ribble.186 A plaintiff injured in Kaufman County brought
179. Id. at 271-72.
180. 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967).
181. 543 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ).
182. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308, § 19 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980).
183. 103 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1937, no writ).
184. Id. at 399.
185. Id
186. 260 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, no writ).
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suit there to set aside a Board award. The carrier filed a plea of privilege
to be sued in Dallas County. No controverting plea was filed by the claim-
ant. A hearing was held, however, and upon determining that the injury
had occurred in Kaufman County, the trial court overruled the plea of
privilege. The carrier appealed, contending that absent a controverting
plea, no hearing should have been held, no evidence should have been
received, and the case should have been transferred to Dallas County. The
appellate court, affirming the trial court's retention of the case, concluded
that venue and the procedure for determining venue were controlled by
the Act, and not by the general provisions of article 1995.'87 The court
observed that when suit is brought in a county other than the county of
injury, and that matter is timely brought to the attention of the trial court,
the court should, on its own motion or on motion of either party, transfer
the case to a proper county. 188 The court in Ribble further held that article
8307a does not provide for nor comprehend a plea of privilege or contro-
verting plea procedure.189 No waiver was effected by the employee's fail-
ure to controvert the carrier's plea of privilege.' 90
A basic venue question was handled differently in Texas Employers In-
surance Association v. Baeza.'91 The Board awarded the employee total
and permanent disability benefits at a maximum compensation rate. The
carrier appealed to a district court in Dallas County, the alleged county of
injury, on April 6. The employee had filed suit in Ector County, however,
on April 5. The employee then filed an unsworn plea in abatement in the
Dallas County suit. The carrier moved that the plea in abatement be
stricken because it was unverified and because the Ector County suit was
filed simply for the purpose of securing "a priority," in view of the fact that
the award had granted the plaintiff all that he could possibly recover. At a
hearing, the trial court sustained the plea in abatement and dismissed the
carrier's suit. On appeal, the court of civil appeals reversed and ordered
that the case be reinstated, basing the reversal on insufficiencies in the
proof of the pendency of the prior suit.192
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Jones193 the plaintiff, who
lived in Dallas County, was injured in Collin County. The carrier ap-
pealed from an adverse award, filing suit in Dallas County. The plaintiff
answered, counterclaimed, and moved that the case be transferred to Col-
lin County, the county of injury. Disregarding article 8307, section 5, the
trial court ordered the case transferred to Collin County. The carrier ap-
pealed. The Eastland court of civil appeals held that the interlocutory or-
der transferring the case to Collin County was properly appealable at this
187. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980).
188. 260 S.W.2d at 720.
189. Id
190. See also Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Lester, 481 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1972, no writ).
191. 584 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
192. Id at 320-21.
193. 580 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
[Vol. 34
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
time, and held that Dallas County was a proper and permissible county. 194
Article 8307a was not applicable, according to the court, since article 8307,
section 5 now permitted filing of suit in either the county of residence or
the county where the injury occurred. Thus, the Dallas court did have
venue. 
95
D. Sufficiency of Evidence Cases
A number of cases during the survey year reached the appellate courts
on points attacking the factual sufficiency of evidence to support jury find-
ings of total incapacity, permanent incapacity, lump sum awards, average
weekly wage earning capacity, and other answers returned by juries. 196
Little is to be gained by any in-depth discussion of those cases or the evi-
dence or lack of evidence complained of. There is little consistency in the
results. Justice Dodson of the Amarillo court of civil appeals sums up the
situation accurately in stating: "We conclude that many cases can be cited
pro and con on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
jury finding of total and permanent disability. We respectfully refrain
from undertaking the impossible task of attempting to reconcile all of these
cases." 19
7
194. Id at 891.
195. Note that art. 8307a was amended in 1979, as discussed in text accompanying note 1
supra.
196. For cases favoring the plaintiff, see American Home Assurance Co. v. Burnett, 585
S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v.
Cervantes, 584 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hicks v.
Industrial Underwriters Ins. Co., 582 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ);
Transport Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 580 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); International Ins. Co. v. Torres, 576 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Manning, 574 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Armstrong, 572 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1978, no writ). For rulings favorable to the defendant, see Evans v. Casu-
alty Reciprocal Exch., 579 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Sallee v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 574 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no
writ).
197. International Ins. Co. v. Torres, 576 S.W.2d 862, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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